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Introduction 
As a NEST High-Level Expert Group pointed out in 2005, synthetic biology, i.e. “the 
synthesis of complex, biologically based (or inspired) systems which display functions that 
do not exist in nature … is a field with enormous scope and potential.”1 Some of the areas 
where synthetic biology according to the NEST report could have a major impact include 
biomedicine, a sustainable chemical industry, environment and energy, and biomaterials. 
However, the report also acknowledges that “[m]uch of the research so far has been 
pioneered by individual groups in the US, and the European research community has been 
slow to embrace the field.”2 If the emerging discipline of synthetic biology can deliver on 
its promises and become as pervasive as computing has become in the past few decades, 
we might very well be witnessing a similarly fundamental shift as the one that happened to 
chemistry with the introduction of the periodic table. Biology ultimately may also become 
a mechanistic science. 
 The ability to understand, modify, and ultimately create new life at the molecular 
level clearly represents a scientific paradigm shift. One problem with similar breakthroughs 
in the past has been their misuse for offensive military purposes. As Dando has 
demonstrated, several generations of state biological warfare programs during the 20th 
century regularly utilized major scientific developments in biology and medicine: 
„What we can see over the last century is a continuous process of military programs 
developing on the back of growth in scientific knowledge. There have been three 
generations of offensive biological warfare programs this century: the simple sabotage 
campaigns of the First World War; the major-state programs of the middle years of the 
century; and the Soviet program following the agreement of the BTWC, where the use 
of genetic engineering was significant.“3
A brief look into two specific applications of major impact expected from synthetic biology 
as described in the above mentioned NEST report – smart drugs, and vectors for therapy – 
should suffice to illustrate the quantum leap in biological warfare or bioterrorist 
capabilities that may result from advances in synthetic biology. According to the NEST 
report, “[a] smart drug includes a diagnostic module that … is capable of directly sensing 
of molecular disease indicators … it will only become active in cells affected by disease.”4 
The misuse potential of such smart drug technology is obvious: if the sensing mechanism 
were programmed to detect other, not disease related, indicators and/or the activated 
chemical compound either were to harm, not cure, or would simply be administered in the 
wrong dosage, considerable harm could be done with such a device. Similarly, it is 
conceivable that newly designed or modified viral vectors that can “deliver healthy genes 
to the target tissue” or that “can recognize specific cells and target them for destruction”5 
                                                 
1  Synthetic Biology. Applying Engineering to Biology, Report of a NEST High-Level Expert Group, 
Brussels: European Commission, 2005, p.5. 
2  Ibid. 
3  Malcolm R. Dando, ‘The Impact of the Development of Modern Biology and Medicine on the 
Evolution of Offensive Biological Warfare Programs in the Twentieth Century’, in Defense 
Analysis, 15(1), 1999, p.51. 
4  Synthetic Biology. Applying Engineering to Biology, p.14 
5  Idem. 
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could be easily diverted from their intended benign use to malign applications that would 
for example aim at delivering pathogenic genes or target not cancer, but nerve or other 
essential cells. 
 Although the risks for misuse inherent in synthetic biology are briefly discussed in 
the above mentioned NEST report6, it is clear that a thorough analysis and discussion of 
the misuse potential of synthetic biology for bioterrorist, or offensive military purposes has 
not taken place. In parallel to the focus of activities in synthetic biology in general, which 
have been concentrated in the United States, most of the discourse on preventing the 
misuse of this new field of scientific inquiry also originated there. In 2004 for example 
George Church put forward “A Synthetic Biohazard Non-proliferation Proposal” to address 
some of the biosecurity concerns of synthetic biology.7 Since then, the debate on the 
biosecurity implications of synthetic biology has made some progress, again most notably 
in the US.8 What is needed to develop a similarly lively debate in Europe on these topics is 
first of all an increased awareness of the dual-use character of their work and the 
corresponding biosecurity implications on the part of European practitioners in synthetic 
biology. But what is their level of awareness in the first place? To find an answer to this 
question is one of the main goals of this study. 
In order to accomplish this goal, this report will consist of four sections: the first 
section will provide some background/context to the analysis of biosecurity awareness of 
practicing synthetic biologists in Europe by focussing on biosecurity and other regulations 
applicable to the life sciences and biotechnology sector in Europe. The second section will 
provide an overview of biosecurity-related activities during SB3.0, mostly focussing on the 
panel on societal issues which was convened during the second day of the conference. The 
third section will provide an analysis of 20 interviews which were begun in the run-up to 
SB3.0 and continued since. The last part will then look at possible future regulatory 
environments for synthetic biology in Europe, again taking into account responses received 
during the interviews.  
 
1. Biosecurity and other regulations applicable to synthetic biology in Europe 
The most fundamental and wide-reaching regulatory instrument to prevent the misuse of 
biology is the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), which in Article I 
prohibits states parties to  
“develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: … Microbial or other 
biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and 
in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purposes …”9  
                                                 
6  Ibid, pp.18f. 
7  George Church, A Synthetic Biohazard Nonproliferation Proposal, 18 June 2004, available at 
Hhttp://arep.med.harvard.edu/SBP/Church_Biohazard04c.htmH  
8  Some of the key developments in this unfolding discourse will be discussed in section 3 below. 
9  For the text of the BWC see Hwww.opbw.orgH  
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Ever since the entry into force of the BWC in 1975 its states parties – which include all 
European states – have reaffirmed during the quinquennial Review Conferences that new 
scientific and technological developments of relevance to the treaty are covered by the 
scope of Article I.10 For example, the final declaration the most recent Review Conference 
in 2006 reaffirmed that “Article I applies to all scientific and technological developments 
in the life sciences and in other fields of science relevant to the Convention.”11
According to Article IV of the BWC each state party is under an obligation to 
implement all aspects of the BWC “within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction 
or under its control anywhere”. Because there is no international organisation available to 
oversee BWC implementation and there is no reporting requirement contained in the BWC, 
up until recently it was difficult to establish to what extent states parties actually lived up to 
this obligation. However, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 of April 2004 
required all UN member states to report to a committee of the Council on their actions to  
“adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to 
manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or 
biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as 
well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an 
accomplice, assist or finance them”.12
The national reports and concomitant legislative database established by the 1540 
Committee provide an excellent overview of the extent and density of rules and regulations 
applicable across Europe.13
A further source of stipulations to prevent the misuse of dual-use technologies and 
material stems from Australia Group Lists and Guidelines and corresponding EU 
Regulations. The Australia Group was established in 1984 in response to the realisation 
that exports of dual-use goods had substantially contributed to the Iraqi chemical weapons 
program and its subsequent use against Iranian troops. Export controls were thus initially 
applied to chemical dual-use materials and technologies, but later – in 1990 – expanded to 
cover biological dual-use items as well. Since its inception the Australia Group has grown 
from 15 to over 30 states participating in its activities and the scope of controlled items has 
equally expanded. The activities of its members are now informed by six control lists and a 
set of guidelines.14 Of particular relevance here is that the “List of Biological Agents for 
Export Control” also covers genetic elements and genetically-modified organisms, in 
particular: 
                                                 
10  See Alexander Kelle/Kathryn Nixdorff/Malcolm Dando, Controlling Biochemical Weapons. 
Adapting Multilateral Arms Control for the 21st Century, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
especially chapter 3. 
11  Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the BWC, Final Document, Geneva: United 
Nations, document BWC/CONF.VI/6, p.9, available at Hwww.opbw.orgH  
12  For details see the website of the so-called 1540-Committee at   
Hhttp://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540/H  
13  Both national reports and the legislative database, the latter of which contains numerous links to 
national laws and regulations are available on the 1540-Committee webpage. 
14  See Hwww.australiagroup.netH for more details. 
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“1. Genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with the 
pathogenicity of any of the microorganisms in the list.  
2. Genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences coding for any of the 
toxins in the list, or for their sub-units.  
3. Genetically-modified organisms that contain nucleic acid sequences associated 
with the pathogenicity of any of the microorganisms in the list.  
4. Genetically-modified organisms that contain nucleic acid sequences coding for 
any of the toxins in the list or for their sub-units.” 
The Australia Group Guidelines and Lists are supplemented on EU level by Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 1334/2000 creating a Community regime for the control of exports of 
dual-use items and technology15, and subsequent Council regulations which amend and 
update this regional export control regime.16 The purpose of these regulations – which 
automatically acquire the power of law in member states – is “to prevent competing 
national systems causing trade problems, to prevent the encouragement of laxity for 
economic benefit and to allow dual-use items to move freely inside the internal market.”17
 
In addition to these security related international instruments, the regulatory environment 
for synthetic biology in Europe is also influenced by other international agreements such 
as: 
• the 1992 Biodiversity Convention that requires countries to regulate the use and release 
into the environment of genetically modified organisms that could have an adverse 
impact on biodiversity;18 
• the 1995 UNEP Technical Guidelines for Safety in Biotechnology, which point to the 
need of effective oversight of activities involving organisms with novel traits;19 
• and the 2004 WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual, which in its latest edition contains a 
short section on laboratory biosecurity measures.20 
 
In sum, there is a wide variety of international governance structures available to inform 
the EU-wide or national regulation of the life sciences in order to prevent their misuse. 
However, it appears that only in the area of export controls a coherent and systematic body 
of rules and regulations has been set up. Otherwise, as evidenced by the national 
                                                 
15  See Official Journal of the European Communities, Vol.43, 30 June 2000, pp.216f., available at   
Hhttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2000/l_159/l_15920000630en02160217.pdfH  
16  These are Council Regulation (EC) No. 149/2003, available at      
Hhttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2003/l_030/l_03020030205en00010215.pdfH  
Council Regulation (EC) No 1504/2004 of 19 July 2004, available at  
Hhttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/l_281/l_28120040831en00010225.pdfH;  
Council Regulation (EC) No 394/2006 of 27 February 2006, available at    
Hhttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_074/l_07420060313en00010227.pdfH  
17  Genomics Gateway at Hhttp://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/gateway/europe/misuse/dual_use.htmH  
18  See Hwww.biodiv.orgH for details. 
19  See Hhttp://www.biosafetyprotocol.be/UNEPGuid/Contents.htmlH for details. 
20  See Hhttp://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2004/9241546506_partII.pdfH for details. 
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submissions to the 1540 Committee of the United Nations Security Council, regulations on 
biological weapons prohibition and bioterrorism seem to exist largely unconnected to rules 
for the conduct of genetic engineering and biotechnology research and applications.21 A 
greater degree of integration seems advisable in order to prevent at all levels the misuse of 
synthetic biology for hostile purposes. 
 
2. Biosecurity-related issues during SB3.0 
The biosecurity-related activities during SB 3.0 were mostly revolving around the panel 
session on “Biosafety and Biosecurity, Public Perception” during the morning of the 
second day of the conference.22  
In his introductory presentation on “Framing the Safety and Security Aspects of 
Synthetic Biology”, Markus Schmidt, IDC, was setting the scene not only for this panel, 
but also parts of the later one on Ethical Issues by alluding to the fact that in many 
languages only one word is used to capture the meaning of both “biosafety” and 
“biosecurity”. Drawing on definitions put forward by the World Health Organisation he 
emphasised the element of intentionality to distinguish the two concepts. While biosafety 
measures aim to prevent the unintentional exposure to pathogens and toxins, or their 
accidental release, biosecurity measures focus on the prevention of theft, misuse, or 
intentional release of pathogens and toxins.23  
In analogy to the rights management for certain computer software Schmidt raised 
the question whether access to the products of synthetic genomics might be structured in a 
similar way. In such a scheme “read” operations, i.e. accessing published knowledge, 
would be least restricted, “write” operations, such as DNA synthesis and screening, would 
be controlled somewhat more tightly and “execute” operations, like the booting of a cell 
with synthetic DNA, would face the most severe restrictions. 
Addressing different options for countering the intentional misuse of synthetic 
biology, Schmidt pointed to their dependency on the risk perception involved and alluded 
to differences in this respect between the US and Europe, with the risk of bioterrorist 
attacks being judged as more likely in the former. This has led to a higher level of 
institutional responses in the US, ranging from the creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security and the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity to community based 
initiatives such as the work carried out by a consortium including the MIT, CSIS and the J 
Craig Venter Institute (see below) in order to counter this perceived threat. In contrast to 
the focus on biosecurity in the US, Schmidt expressed the expectation that a European 
debate on the implications of synthetic biology would focus more on biosafety, bioethical, 
intellectual property rights (IPR) and less on biosecurity issues. From this he concluded 
                                                 
21  See Hhttp://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540/report.htmlH.  
22  See Hhttp://www.syntheticbiology3.ethz.ch/monday.htmH  
23  For a comparable distinction made in a working paper submitted to the Sixth Review Conference of 
the Biological Weapons Convention see Biosafety and Biosecurity. Submitted by Germany on Behalf 
of the European Union. Document BWC/VI/WP.2, Geneva, 20 October 2006, available at 
Hwww.opbw.orgH . 
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that a “global common technology assessment is hardly in sight”24 and, one might add, a 
continued dialogue is urgently needed to bridge a potential transatlantic divide. 
The following presentation by Michele Garfinkel of the J Craig Venter Institute 
discussed the draft report ‘Synthetic Genomics: Options for Governance’ which, besides a 
focus on biosecurity issues, i.e. the nefarious application and bioterrorist use of the broad 
array of new capabilities provided by synthetic genomics, also does address environmental 
and biosafety risks. Garfinkel stressed that the aim of the report is to offer options to policy 
makers, not recommendations. The most effective intervention point for preventing the 
misuse of synthetic genomics identified by the authors of the report is at the level of DNA 
synthesis itself, i.e. gene synthesis firms, oligonucleotide manufacturers and DNA 
synthesizers. Thus, policy options discussed were from a biosecurity point of view assessed 
in terms of their usefulness in preventing incidents of bioterrorism or by helping to respond 
to such incidents after they had occurred. For both gene foundries and oligo manufacturers 
the authors of the report concluded that a combination of screening orders by companies 
and the certification of orders by a biosafety/biosecurity officer provide the greatest 
benefits in terms of preventing incidents. For helping to respond after an incident had 
occurred, the storage of order information by firms was regarded as the most useful tool. 
Finally, with a view to equipment such as DNA synthesizers, the report concluded that the 
licensing of both equipment and for the purchase of reagents was best suited to enhance 
biosecurity by contributing to the prevention of incidents. 
Taking a step back from the more focussed concerns of the previous speaker about 
the benefits and risks of synthetic genomics, Joyce Tait from the University of Edinburgh 
addressed issues surrounding “Policy, Public and Science Interactions”. Starting from the 
question of how innovative technologies in general get developed, with a view to synthetic 
biology she quickly moved on to the issue of how SB should be framed for public 
consumption, so as to increase levels of acceptance by the public. From her point of view, 
however, the SB community was still in a process of framing the issues for themselves. 
Therefore, science strategies to ensure public acceptance aren’t far developed at this point 
in time. Because of the likelihood of activists who want to impede new technologies 
getting involved before technology-supporting groups, Tait also questioned the 
conventional wisdom that early public involvement automatically generates higher levels 
of public acceptance for innovative technologies. Instead she suggested to rely on the 
conditioning effects of expert framing of the issues before the public involvement process 
is started. This, in Tait’s view requires inter alia to make the science work, develop 
marketable products, create positive market expectations, engage with public stakeholders, 
develop regulatory systems and cooperate in all these areas internationally. All these steps 
will enable the SB community to “be ready with effective responses to the emergence of 
unexpected risks or to illegal behaviour by rogue developers”.25
This latter concern was then taken up by the following speakers, Gautam Mukunda 
of the MIT and Scott Mohr of Boston University, who presented a paper on the 
“Biosecurity Implications of DNA Synthesis and Synthetic Biology”. Their paper was 
                                                 
24  Markus Schmidt, ‘Framing the Safety and Security Aspects of Synthetic Biology’ in SB3.0 
Conference Proceedings, Zurich, 2007, p.31. 
25  Joyce Tait, ‘Riding a Roller-Coaster: Policy Public and Science Interactions in Synthetic Biology, in 
SB3.0 proceedings, p.34. 
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focussing on the differentials introduced by DNA synthesis and Synthetic Biology over 
genetic engineering in general, and distinguished between three different time frames of up 
to five years (short term), between 5 and 10 years (medium term) and over 10 years (long 
term). For the short term Mukunda and Mohr expected few security implications of 
available synthetic biology knowledge and tools. For the medium term they pointed not 
only to risks but also potential defensive benefits of synthetic biology advances that might 
lead to better biosensors, the identification of new drug targets, and the streamlined 
production of vaccines and therapeutics. However, they cautioned that the utility of SB 
advances might be higher to a potential attacker for whom it might be easier to obtain 
natural agents or to engineer novel pathogens. Mukunda and Mohr further pointed out that 
alongside the development of new knowledge, part of the SB research agenda was the 
diffusion of capabilities and the concomitant “de-skilling” of the manipulation of living 
organisms. This, they cautioned, could allow a larger group of scientists to turn a pathogen 
into a weapon. In addition, they saw the norm against BW coming under increasing threat: 
first, SB might make biological warfare agents more predictable and controllable and 
thereby increase the temptation to use them; second, an increase in the threat perception 
may lead more states to undertake aggressive defensive BW programmes. Such activities 
can be expected to be difficult to distinguish for outside observers, which in turn might 
then feel forced to embark on extensive defensive BW programmes. In order to counter the 
potential negative biosecurity implications of SB, Mukunda and Mohr put forward three 
policy proposals: first, they proposed a surveillance regime, the details of which would be 
dependent on the degree of centralization of DNA synthesis. They secondly advocated the 
strengthening of norms against BW through both community and policy responses and 
finally recommended to pursue defensive opportunities provided by SB to the fullest extent 
possible. 
The final presentation of the panel was contributed by Ralf Wagner, Geneart AG, 
on “Insights into Control Mechanisms on Worldwide Distribution of Synthetic DNA from 
an Industrial Perspective”. In his presentation he elaborated on the existing regulatory 
network to control the distribution of synthetic DNA. This regulatory network is, according 
to Wagner, composed of three elements: biosafety regulations provide guidelines for the 
production of genetically modified organisms; biosecurity measures as mandated by export 
controls and customs regulations; corporate ethics, according to which not everything that 
can be done should be done. On the basis of these measures orders are routinely checked 
(1) against the so-called Hadex exclusion list naming customers that are prevented from 
receiving dual-use goods, (2) against a country exclusion list for the shipping of dual-use 
goods, and (3) for the nature of the requested sequence (virulence factors). With a view to 
improvements of the current system, Wagner suggested drawing up a “white list” of 
institutions and companies for which the processing of orders could be simplified, 
developing a list of pathogenicity and virulence factor associated genes and making the use 
of screening software, such as the one developed by the International Consortium for 
Polynucleotide Synthesis (ICPS) mandatory as an industry standard to be applied by all 
DNA manufacturers. In conclusion, he advocated to leave the screening responsibility to 
manufacturers who should in case of suspicious orders contact government authorities. 
Overall, the panel provided an excellent overview across the three dimensions to be 
covered: biosafety, biosecurity and public perception. Not only covered the presentations – 
and subsequent discussion – a broad range of issues from ensuring public support for 
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innovative technologies to detailed proposals for increasing biosafety and biosecurity of 
synthetic biology technologies and potential applications, but also brought together rather 
abstract and conceptual papers with reports based on first hand experience of practitioners 
in the field of DNA synthesis. 
 
Biosecurity issues also featured during the afternoon roundtable on bioethics, mostly 
through the contribution of Malcolm Dando, from the Department of Peace Studies at 
Bradford University. Dando started his intervention with the statement that biologists and 
security analysts inhabit parallel universes. While security analysts have increasingly 
become concerned with the dual-use nature and misuse potential of biology and the life 
sciences, researchers in these areas usually do not share such concerns. Drawing on the 
history of misuse of progress in the life sciences during the 20th century26, Dando raised the 
question whether misuse of the current revolution in the life sciences, in which the 
development of synthetic biology takes a prominent place, can be prevented. Based on 
responses from 1,600 life scientists during 60 seminars in 8 countries Dando concluded 
that while this might be a theoretical possibility, attitudes and awareness of life scientists 
pointed clearly to a repetition of the misuse pattern of the past century. Life scientists, 
according to Dando, do not share the threat perception widespread among biosecurity 
experts concerning bioterrorism or biological warfare. They don’t think that their own 
work might contribute to the threat. Life scientists have practically no knowledge of 
debates within and concerns of the security community and they have no knowledge of 
legally binding international regulatory instruments, such as the Biological Weapons 
Convention (BWC). At the same time, Dando reported, political momentum was increasing 
to come to terms with the dual-use nature of the life sciences on the national and 
international levels. Resolutions 1540 and 1673 of the United Nations Security Council and 
the deliberations of the states parties to the BWC with respect to the national 
implementation of their treaty obligations were only the most visible manifestations of this 
trend. Synthetic biologists should not assume that those in charge of drawing up laws and 
regulations would necessarily have the interests of the scientific community in mind. It is 
from Dando’s point of view therefore imperative that life scientists get involved in this 
process and help identify intervention points if not only the misuse potential of legitimate 
and benign work is to be minimised, but also favourable framework conditions for such 
benign work to be maintained. 
 
3. Biosecurity awareness among European synthetic biology practitioners  
One of the key pre-requisites of any degree of involvement is, of course, a certain level of 
awareness of biosecurity issues on part of the synthetic biology community. In order to 
assess this level of awareness, 18 leading European SB practitioners have been interviewed 
between June and October 2007. More specifically, the interviews set out to investigate the 
awareness of European synthetic biologists of dual-use issues and proposals in relation to: 
                                                 
26  Malcolm R. Dando, ‘The Impact of the Development of Modern Biology and Medicine on the 
Evolution of Offensive Biological Warfare Programs in the Twentieth Century’, in Defense 
Analysis, Vol.15, No.1, 1999, pp.43-62. 
  - 10 - 
Alexander Kelle  Synthetic Biology & Biosecurity Awareness in Europe 
• The seven categories of problematic experiments, as defined by the so-called Fink 
Committee of the US National Academies of Sciences (NAS) and the Committee’s 
recommendations; 
• The work of the so-called Lemon-Relman Committee of the NAS, especially the 2nd 
of its recommendations which calls for the adoption of a broader view of the threat 
spectrum; 
• The Declaration of the Second International Meeting on Synthetic Biology, 
Berkeley, 20-22 May 2006; 
• The CSIS-MIT-Venter draft report on the regulation of synthetic genomics; 
• Activities of the NSABB in the US, with particular emphasis on the work of its SB 
working group; 
• The University of Maryland project on Controlling Dangerous Pathogens, which 
advocates a protective oversight system for biotechnology. 
These manifestations of an increasingly active discourse on security implications of the life 
sciences have been selected for their importance in advancing the debate and understanding 
of the dual-use risks inherent in the revolution in the life sciences in general or with respect 
to synthetic biology in particular, for the proposed solutions to the identified biosecurity 
issues, or for both of these reasons. In short, they are the key markers in the emergent 
biosecurity discourse, which has so far been shaped and led predominantly in the US. 
4.1. The Fink Committee and its recommendations.  
The work of the Committee on Research Standards and Practices to Prevent the Destructive 
Application of Biotechnology, chaired by Gerald R. Fink – hence called the Fink 
Committee – was a reaction to increasing concerns in the US that research in the life 
sciences might be misused for bioterrorist or biowarfare purposes. These concerns, in turn 
were fuelled by a number of experiments that triggered substantial debate about the 
advisability of such research. Whether it should be carried out, or, if carried out, its results 
should be published. In particular three experiments gave rise to such debates: 
• unintentionally potentiating the virulence of the mousepox virus through inserting an 
IL-4 gene into the mousepox genome.27 While this experiment resulted in the 
unexpected result of creating a killer mousepox virus, subsequent work by another 
scientist, Mark Buller at Saint Louis University, has knowingly carried these 
experiments one step further by increasing the lethality of the mousepox virus and by 
carrying out similar manipulations in the cowpox virus.28 
                                                 
27  R. J. Jackson et.al., ‘Expression of mouse interleukin-4 by a recombinant ectromelia virus 
suppresses cytolytic lymphocyte responses and overcomes genetic resistance to mousepox’, Journal 
of Virology, 75 (2001) pp.1205-1210; R. Nowak, ‘Disaster in the making. An engineered mouse 
virus leaves us one step away from the ultimate bioweapon’, New Scientist (13 January 2001) pp.4-
5. 
28  M. Buller, The potential use of genetic engineering to enhance orthopoxviruses as bioweapons. 
Presentation at the International Conference ‘Smallpox Biosecurity. Preventing the Unthinkable’ 
(21-22 October 2003) Geneva, Switzerland; J.D. Steinbruner and E.D. Harris, ‘When science breeds 
nightmares’, International Herald Tribune (3 December 2003); D. MacKenzie, ‘US develops lethal 
new viruses’, New Scientist, 180, 6 (2003). 
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• synthesis of the poliovirus genome from ‘chemically synthesized oligonucleotides that 
were linked together and then transfected into cells’, thereby creating an infectious 
virus from scratch, combining knowledge of the viral DNA with assembly of the 
correct chemical compounds.29 
• transfer of the virulence factor of variola major (which causes smallpox) into the 
vaccinia virus, which is of much lower virulence and usually used for vaccinations 
against smallpox.30 
Against this background the Committee was specifically tasked to ‘recommend changes 
in… practices that could improve U.S. capacity to prevent the destructive application of 
biotechnology research while still enabling legitimate research to be conducted.’31 Based 
on several meetings involving a number of external experts, the Committee issued its 
report containing seven recommendations. Although the NAS is not a government body 
that can promulgate laws or regulations, its recommendations are often put into practice by 
the United States or other governments and even more often reverberate in scientific and 
academic discourse. In the case of the Fink Committee’s seven recommendations this 
pattern has repeated itself. The recommendations are: 
1. Educating the Scientific Community. To this end the Committee called upon national 
and international professional societies to create appropriate programs that would 
familiarize scientists with the dual-use dilemma inherent in biotechnology research. 
2. Review of Plans for Experiments. This review should be entrusted to the already 
existing Institutional Biosafety Committee infrastructure and be supplemented by an 
additional “Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee”. Experiments of concern are 
those that: 
1. Would demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineffective; 
2. Would confer resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics or antiviral agents; 
3. Would enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a nonpathogen virulent; 
4. Would increase transmissibility of a pathogen; 
5. Would alter the host range of a pathogen; 
6. Would enable the evasion of diagnostic/detection tools; 
7. Would enable the weaponization of a biological agent or toxin.32 
What is noteworthy in this context is the Committee’s acknowledgement that this set 
of experiments represents only a first approximation of what it considered to be the 
most probable threat scenarios. “Over time, however, the Committee believes it will 
be necessary to expand the experiments of concern to cover a significantly wider 
range of potential threats.” 33
                                                 
29  J. Cello, A.V. Paul and E. Wimmer, ‘Chemical synthesis of poliovirus cDNA: generation of 
infectious virus in the absence of natural template’, Science, 297(2002) pp.1016-1018. 
30  A. M. Rosengard et.al., ‘Variola virus immune evasion design: expression of a highly efficient 
inhibitor of human complement’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA,  99 (2002) 
pp.8808-8813. 
31  Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, p.32. 
32  Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, p.5. 
33  Ibid., p.6. 
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3. Review at the Publication Stage. This was conceived by the Committee as a self 
governance measure by the scientific community to ensure that national security 
relevant information would not fall into the wrong hands.34 
4. Creation of a National Science Advisory Board for Biodefense. Such a body was 
subsequently created by the US government and was tasked to advise and guide the 
government in issues associated with advances in biotechnology, and related security, 
health and ethical issues.35  
5. Additional Elements for Protection Against Misuse. This involves on one hand the 
periodic review of existing legislation and regulation and on the other hand the 
physical protection of biological materials and the oversight of persons with access to 
these materials. 
6. A Role for the Life Sciences in Efforts to Prevent Bioterrorism and Biowarfare in 
collaboration with the national security and law enforcement communities (in the 
US). 
7. Harmonized International Oversight, which would aim at providing on the 
international level oversight mechanisms similar to those proposed by the Committee 
for the US. 
The following table gives an overview of responses given by 20 interviewees concerning 
their awareness of the Fink Committee report and its recommendations. 
Table 1: Awareness of the Fink Committee report and its recommendations: 
Question 1:  Are you aware of the report Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism 
(2004) of the so-called Fink Committee (of the US National Academies) and its 
recommendations? 
Yes No 
aware of report 7 
able to assess 1 
13 
Noteworthy in this context is the fact that of the seven positive responses only one 
interviewee had not only heard of the report, but also provided an opinion on its above 
mentioned recommendations: according to this interviewee the Fink Committee’s 
recommendations are sensible and show the difficulty inherent in any attempt to suggest 
oversight or governance measures for synthetic biology, i.e. that of having to walk a 
tightrope between measures that are effective enough to prevent misuse and at the same 
time are not too restrictive so as to limit scientific and technological progress. 
                                                 
34  According to some observers, the impact of this measure is negligible; see Malcolm R. Dando, 
contribution to the roundtable discussion on “Synthetic Biology and Ethics” at SB 3.0, available at 
Hhttp://www.syntheticbiology3.ethz.ch/monday.htmH.  
35  See section 4.5. below. 
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4.2. The Lemon Relman Committee and its recommendations 
Shortly after the Fink Committee report was published, the US NAS set up the Committee 
on Advances in Technology and the Prevention of their Application to Next Generation 
Bioterrorism and Biological Warfare Threats, the so-called Lemon-Relman Committee, 
named after its two co-chairmen. Although the report of this second Committee clearly 
built on the work of the Fink Committee, it expanded the latter’s work in three directions: 
first, its focus was global, not confined to the US; second, it adopted a forward-looking 
approach, trying to distil scientific and technological trends that would impact on the 
biothreat spectrum over the next five to ten years, and; third, it rejected the limitation of its 
work to traditional biowarfare agents as too narrow. The Committee also rejected a list-
based approach, which, it felt, because of “the pace of research discovery in the life 
sciences is that the useful lifespan of any such list would be measured in months, not 
years.”36 To emphasise this particular point, the report pointed out that “[n]ew, unexpected 
discoveries and applications in RNAi and synthetic biology arose even during the course of 
deliberations by this Committee.”37 Therefore the Committee developed a classification 
scheme for scientific and technological advanced containing four different groups, 
according to the commonalities different technologies are sharing. These four groups are: 
“1. technologies that seek to acquire novel biological or molecular 
diversity;  
2. technologies that seek to generate novel but pre-determined and specific 
biological or molecular entities through directed design;  
3. technologies that seek to understand and manipulate biological systems 
in a more comprehensive and effective manner; and  
4. technologies that seek to enhance production, delivery, and “packaging” 
of biologically active materials.”38
Synthetic biology is explicitly mentioned by the Committee in relation to the first two of 
these categories. A concise discussion of the future applications of synthetic biology in the 
report acknowledges that “DNA synthesis technology could allow for the efficient, rapid 
synthesis of viral and other pathogen genomes – either for the purposes of vaccine or 
therapeutic research and development, or for malevolent purposes or with unintended 
consequences.”39  
It is thus fair to conclude that the biosecurity community during the deliberations of 
the Lemon-Relman Committee had clearly identified synthetic biology as on of the 
technologies that will have a major impact on the future biothreat spectrum. In line with 
this reasoning the Committee recommended to  
                                                 
36  Globalization, Biosecurity and the Future of the Life Sciences, Report by the Committee on 
Advances in Technology and the Prevention of Their Application to Next Generation Biowarfare 
Threats, Washington D.C., The National Academies Press, 2006, p.3. 
37  Ibid, p.103. 
38  Ibid, p.3. 
39  Ibid, p.109. 
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“adopt a broadened awareness of threats beyond the classical “select agents” 
and other pathogenic organisms and toxins, so as to include, for example, 
approaches for disrupting host homeostatic and defense systems, and for 
creating synthetic organisms.”40  
One would therefore hope that the synthetic biology community is aware that its activities 
have become the object of, if not outright concern, then at least careful monitoring and 
analysis by biosecurity experts. As table 2 below shows, none of the interviewees had 
heard of the Lemon-Relman Committee, its report or any of the report’s recommendations. 
Given the obvious concern of the Committee with developments in synthetic biology and 
their impact on the future biothreat spectrum, a reciprocal level of awareness would be a 
prerequisite for the SB community to actively engage in a discourse with biosecurity 
experts. 
Table 2: Awareness of the Lemon-Relman Committee report and its recommendations: 
Question 2:  Have you heard of the report Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the 
Life Sciences (2006) issued by the Committee on Advances in Technology and 
the Prevention of Their Application to Next Generation Biowarfare Threats (the 
so-called Lemon-Relman Committee)? 
Yes No 
aware of report 0 
able to assess 0 
20 
 
4.3. Declaration of the Second International Meeting on Synthetic Biology (SB 2.0) 
This is not to argue that there is no awareness of the societal implications of their work on 
the part of synthetic biology. To the contrary, as the Declaration of the Second 
International Meeting on Synthetic Biology (and the activities during SB3.0 discussed 
above) demonstrates, there is such awareness and societal implications are taken seriously 
by many in the SB community. In case of the SB 2.0 a full day was devoted to discussion 
of such issues and the subsequently formulated declaration of May 2006 contains four 
resolutions that clearly aim at addressing some of the dual-use implications of synthetic 
biology, in particular DNA synthesis that may give rise to safety or security concerns.41 
The focus on DNA synthesis is also reflected in two of the four resolutions contained in the 
final declaration. These resolutions support the 
“…development of improved software tools that can be used to check DNA 
synthesis orders for DNA sequences encoding hazardous biological systems … 
… adoption of best-practice sequence checking technology, including customer 
and order validation, by all commercial DNA synthesis companies … 
                                                 
40  Ibid, p.5, 177f. 
41  See the revised public draft of the declaration at Hhttps://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/18185H.  
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… ongoing and future discussions within international science and engineering 
research communities for the purpose of developing creative solutions and 
frameworks that directly address challenges arising from the ongoing advances 
in biological technology, in particular, challenges to biological security and 
biological justice … 
… ongoing and future discussions with all stakeholders for the purpose of 
developing and analysing governance options … such that the development and 
application of biological technology remains overwhelmingly constructive.”42  
In terms of practical next steps to be pursued, the declaration announces the formation of 
an open working group in support of the improvement of existing software tools for 
checking DNA sequences, as well as the completion of a study to “develop policy options 
that might be used to govern DNA synthesis technology”.43
When asked about their awareness of the declaration of SB 2.0 and its contents, 
more than half of the interviewees, 12 out of 20, said they were aware of the declaration. 
This is a markedly higher level of awareness when compared to the previous two studies 
that were external to the synthetic biology community’s own attempts to address 
biosecurity concerns. However, of the 12 positive respondents only three felt they were in a 
position to give an assessment of the four resolutions contained in the SB 2.0 declaration.  
Table 3: Awareness of the SB 2.0 declaration and its resolutions: 
Question 3:  Are you aware of the existence and contents of the Declaration of the Second 
International Meeting on Synthetic Biology? 
Yes No 
aware of existence 12 
able to assess 3 
8 
For one interviewee the self-regulatory approach contained in the resolutions was sufficient 
to address biosecurity issues related to synthetic biology. The second interviewee 
concurred with this assessment and pointed out the usefulness of the declaration and its 
resolutions in organising the work of his own organisation with respect to biosecurity 
questions. The third interviewee, in contrast, regarded the scope of the declaration as 
inappropriate, its tone very US-centred and too much concerned with not standing in the 
way of commercial developments. 
4.4. CSIS-MIT-Venter draft report on the regulation of synthetic genomics 
As the following table shows, half of all interviewees were aware of the CSIS-MIT-Venter 
(draft) report on Synthetic Genomics, to which the SB 2.0 declaration had made explicit 
reference. 
                                                 
42  SB 2.0 public draft declaration, p.3. 
43  Details of this study were presented during SB3.0 by Michele Garfinkel of the Venter Institute (see 
section 3 above) 
  - 16 - 
Alexander Kelle  Synthetic Biology & Biosecurity Awareness in Europe 
Table 4: Awareness of the (draft) report Synthetic Genomics. Options for Governance. 
Question 4:  Have you heard of the (draft) report Synthetic Genomics. Options for 
Governance, produced by CSIS, MIT and the Venter Institute? 
Yes No 
aware of report 10 
able to assess 2 
10 
Because some of the interviews were conducted during or after SB 3.0 when the draft 
report was presented in the panel session on societal issues, these results are likely to have 
been affected by the timing of the interviews in relation to the presentation. Support for this 
assumption can be derived from the fact that two interviewees made explicit reference to 
Dr Garfinkel’s presentation when answering the question. It is also noteworthy that only 
two of the respondents who had knowledge of the draft report were able to provide an 
assessment of the policy options put forward in the report. According to one interviewee 
the options are “overdone”, not amenable to be put into practice easily, and not 
commensurate to the risks involved. In contrast, the second interviewee found the options 
discussed “not significant enough” in relation to the problem at hand. 
As some of the major findings concerning biosecurity issues of the report have 
already been addressed in relation to its presentation during SB 3.0,44 only a few additional 
comments shall be made as to the study’s assumptions and the character of the policy 
options it is presenting.45 Noteworthy in this context is the study groups assessment that  
“today, any synthesis of viruses, … remains relatively difficult. In the near 
future, however, the risk of nefarious use will rise because of the increasing 
speed and capability of the technology and its widening accessibility.”46
It would therefore appear that there is a window of opportunity available now to devise and 
implement the most effective governance system to prevent the misuse of synthetic biology 
in the future. Given this urgency, it is somewhat puzzling that the authors of the report 
stress at several points that they are only providing policy options, and are not making 
recommendations. On a different level it is also questionable whether this self-selected 
detachment is actually sustainable: clearly, through presenting and discussing some 
options, but not others, the issues are framed in a certain way that cannot but influence 
discussions in the policy-making process. For doing this in a particular way, the report was 
immediately criticised from two different groups: while according to the ETC Group the 
report represented only a “partial consideration of governance by a partisan group of 
authors” which “overlooks important questions related to power, control and economic 
impacts of synthetic biology”,47 the Sunshine Project focused on the expanded role 
                                                 
44  See section 3 above. 
45  The final version of the report is available since 17 October 2007 and can be accessed via 
Hhttp://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071017_synthetic_genomics_options.pdfH
46  Synthetic Genomics. Options for Governance, p.12. 
47  See the ETC Group, Syns of Omission: Civil Society Organizations Respond to Report on Synthetic 
Biology Governance from the J. Craig Venter Institute and Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, press 
  - 17 - 
Alexander Kelle  Synthetic Biology & Biosecurity Awareness in Europe 
foreseen in the report for Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBC) in overseeing synthetic 
biology.48 An additional shortcoming of the report might be seen in its limited 
geographical focus on the US alone. This is not necessarily corresponding to the 
description of the risk in the report itself, which – as quoted above – acknowledges the 
“widening accessibility” of synthetic biology knowledge and technologies. It also seems 
out of step with the realisation of the wider biosecurity community that an exclusive US 
focus is far too narrow for adequately addressing the dual-use potential of synthetic 
biology. Thus, the opening up of the biosecurity discourse beyond US borders that was 
observable from the work of the Fink Committee to the Lemon-Relman Committee of the 
NAS seems to have been reversed with this study. 
4.5. The Work of the NSABB and its synthetic biology working group 
Following one of the recommendations contained in the Fink Committee Report, the US 
government set up the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity in March 2004.49 
According to its charter, NSABB is to “provide advice, guidance, and leadership regarding 
biosecurity oversight of dual-use research, defined as biological research with legitimate 
scientific purpose that may be misused to pose a biologic threat to public health and/or 
national security.” Its activities range from developing “criteria for identifying dual-use 
research and research results” to “guidelines for the oversight of dual-use research, 
including guidelines for the risk/benefit analysis of dual-use biological research and 
research results” to the recommendation of “strategies for coordinated international 
oversight of dual-use biological research.” In order to conduct its work, NSABB can set up 
working groups to address more specific issues. One such working group that had been 
created has focussed its attention on the new field of synthetic biology. In the first phase of 
its work, the NSABB synthetic biology working group has sought to address biosecurity 
implications of the de novo synthesis of select agents.50 A preliminary report of the 
synthetic biology working group was discussed during a NSABB meeting in October 2006 
and has subsequently been submitted to the US government and made available to the 
public.51  
“This report describes the biosecurity concerns identified by the NSABB Working 
Group on Synthetic Genomics that are raised by the ability to reconstruct Select 
Agents de novo, the Working Group’s assessment of the adequacy of the current 
regulatory framework to safeguard against the misuse of this science and its 
recommendations for addressing these concerns.“52
                                                                                                                                                    
release, 17 October 2007, available at   
Hhttp://www.etcgroup.org/en/materials/publications.html?pub_id=654H  
48  The Sunshine Project is a long-standing critic of the performance of IBCs; see their webpage at 
Hhttp://www.sunshine-project.org/H  
49  See Hwww.biosecurityboard.govH for the original charter of NSABB as well as all documents 
subsequently quoted in this section. 
50  Select agents are those biological agents and toxins that can pose a severe threat to public, animal or 
plant health, or to animal or plant products. For the current list of select agents see 
Hhttp://www.cdc.gov/od/sap/docs/salist.pdfH  
51  See NSABB, Addressing Biosecurity Concerns Related to the Synthesis of Select Agents, 
Washington DC, December 2006, available at Hhttp://www.biosecurityboard.gov/pdf/AddressingH 
Biosecurity Concerns Related to the Synthesis of Select Agents.pdf
52  Ibid, p.2. 
  - 18 - 
Alexander Kelle  Synthetic Biology & Biosecurity Awareness in Europe 
The report recommends to the US government inter alia that  
” ... HHS and USDA collaboratively develop and disseminate harmonized guidance to 
investigators and nucleic acid/gene/genome providers concerning the SAR with 
respect to synthetically-derived DNA ...   
... relevant federal agencies ... develop a process to be used by providers of synthetic 
DNA for determining the sequences for which to screen (Select Agents or otherwise) 
...  
... convene a group of experts from the scientific community to conduct an open and in 
depth examination of the Select Agent classification system to determine if it is 
possible to reconcile the current controls for Select Agents with the anticipated 
scientific advances enabled by synthetic genomics ...“53
As the following table shows, less than one fifth of interviewees were aware of the NSABB 
activities and its synthetic biology working group report. Of those who had heard of the 
report, none was in a position to offer an assessment as to its content or recommendations.  
Table 5: Awareness of the NSABB report Addressing Biosecurity Concerns Related to the 
Synthesis of Select Agents 
Question 5:  Are you aware of the NSABB report Addressing Biosecurity Concerns Related to 
the Synthesis of Select Agents, issued in December 2006? 
Yes No 
aware of report 3 
able to assess 0 
17 
 
4.6. The Controlling Dangerous Pathogens project at the University of Maryland 
Since 2002 a group of scholars at the University of Maryland, led by John Steinbruner, has 
developed a protective oversight system for dangerous biological agents and research.54 
The most elaborate version of this proposal has been published as a monograph in spring 
2007.55 Starting from the dual-use dilemma inherent in most, if not all of life sciences 
research, i.e. that “[t]he same basic science that could in principle be highly beneficial 
could also be enormously destructive, depending on how it is applied”,56 Steinbruner and 
colleagues argue the case for “an oversight process designed to bring independent scrutiny 
to bear throughout the world without exception on fundamental research activities that 
might plausibly generate massively destructive or otherwise highly dangerous 
                                                 
53  Ibid, p.10-13. 
54  For an early exposition see John Steinbruner, Protective Oversight of Biotechnology: A Discussion 
Paper, February 2002, available at Hhttp://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/biotechoversight.pdfH  
55  See John Steinbruner, Elisa D. Harris, Nancy Gallagher, Stacy M. Okutani, Controlling Dangerous 
Pathogens. A Prototype Protective Oversight System, College Park: University of Maryland, march 
2007, available at Hhttp://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/pathogens_project_monograph.pdfH  
56  Ibid, p.1. 
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consequences.”57 This proposal goes far beyond any of the other recommendations 
considered so far in two ways: first of all, it advocates subjecting all, not just publicly 
funded, research to independent scrutiny, and second, the proposal’s scope is global, not 
just national. Steinbruner and colleagues argue further that 
“inherently dangerous areas of biological research will have to be subjected to 
a much more systematic process of protective oversight than is yet practiced in 
any country. That will have to be done globally and therefore will have to be 
globally formulated and globally implemented.”58
Such research is then broken down into three categories of activities, each of which will 
necessitate different levels of scrutiny: activities of potential concern will be subjected to 
local peer review oversight, activities of moderate concern to national oversight and 
activities of extreme concern will receive the highest level of scrutiny on the international 
level.59 In order for the peer review process to work at each of the three levels a wide-
ranging licensing of relevant individuals and research facilities will be required. 
 When asked about their awareness of the existence of the Controlling Dangerous 
Pathogens Project conducted at the University of Maryland 6 of the 20 interviewees 
responded positively. As with the previous reports, the level of detailed knowledge about 
the ”Biological Research Security Oversight System” proposed by the University of 
Maryland group turned out to be low: the only interviewee who felt in a position to provide 
an assessment of the groups work thought its approach to the handling of the pathogen 
issue dates back to the Cold War. 
Table 6:  Awareness of the Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project 
Question 6:  Are you familiar with the Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project conducted 
at the University of Maryland? 
Yes No 
aware of project 6 
able to assess 1 
14 
 
In sum, this set of 20 interviews has brought to the fore a low to medium level of 
awareness in quantitative terms on part of European synthetic biology practitioners in 
relation to key developments and reports in the biosecurity area. Around a third of 
interviewees had heard of the Fink Committee and its report, and none was aware of the 
Lemon-Relman Committee and its call to broaden our understanding of the biosecurity 
threat to include synthetic organisms. The only landmark in the emerging biosecurity 
discourse among synthetic biologists to receive a level of awareness of more than 50 per 
                                                 
57  Idem. 
58  Ibid., p.6 
59  For an elaboration of the three categories see ibid, p.25. Although the title of the report seems to 
suggest a focus on pathogens only, the definitions used for “agent” of concern explicitly include the 
categories “genetic element, recombinant nucleic acid, or recombinant organism.” 
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cent is the SB 2.0 declaration discussed above, with the CSIS-MIT-Venter report receiving 
the second highest awareness score. Awareness of NSABB activities with respect to 
synthetic biology or the University of Maryland Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project 
are below the 50 per cent mark, in case of the NSABB the level of awareness is even down 
to 15 per cent. 
 In qualitative terms the picture is even bleaker: only a small part of interviewees, if 
any at all, were in a position to give an assessment of the various Committees, reports and 
recommendations addressed in the interview. Even in the case of the SB 2.0 declaration the 
level of awareness dropped from 60 to 15 per cent, when considering this qualitative 
dimension. This somewhat superficial knowledge on part of many who were in principle 
aware of the unfolding biosecurity discourse with respect to the life sciences in general and 
synthetic biology in particular poses another obstacle to a constructive participation by 
synthetic biology practitioners in that very discourse. 
Table 7: Awareness of the Unfolding Biosecurity Discourse Among European Synthetic 
Biology Practitioners 
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4. Future governance mechanisms for synthetic biology in Europe – between the 
desirable and the inevitable? 
Future governance mechanisms for synthetic biology in Europe could in principle develop 
along three different lines: one with a high degree of oversight and controls (possibly along 
the lines of regulations for GM food in Europe), one with very little regulation and a high 
degree of reliance on institutional encouragement (like for example nanotechnology seems 
to evolve), and one which falls between these two poles of possible regulatory 
environments. When asked about what they regard as a desirable future governance system 
for synthetic biology (from a biosecurity standpoint) interviewees tend to favour a lesser 
degree of regulation, although not many reject the notion of additional governance 
measures altogether. In one of the few instances where this latter point was made, it was 
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argued the work with Yersinia pestis posed more dangers than most research in the field of 
synthetic biology. In contrast, when asked about the from their perspective most likely 
synthetic biology governance system that would address biosecurity concerns, expectations 
expressed by the interviewed SB practitioners are closer to the tighter regulatory end of the 
spectrum. However, a number of interviewees also alluded to the danger of stifling 
scientific progress in case a too tight regulatory layer would be imposed on any self-
governance activities the scientific community might devise itself. 
 The vast majority of interviewees were expressing support for a “middle-of-the-
road” governance regime somewhere in the middle of the spectrum of oversight and 
control measures. While some respondents agree that “some regulation will be needed” and 
place the emphasis of finding the dividing line between harmless and potentially dangerous 
experiments, with one suggestion that experiments involving self-replicating systems might 
serve as a threshold in this context, others advocate the risk assessment for synthetic 
biology experiments to take into account the context of such research: according to this 
latter approach, laboratory experiments might need less stringent rules than those involving 
the release of agents into the environment. Among those seeing a somewhat more 
restrictive governance system as the way forward, there is no doubt that a legal framework 
is part of a desirable oversight and control regime. Implementation of such a regime might, 
according to one interviewee, best be endowed with a higher-level independent 
organisation, such as the Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority, which “is the 
UK's independent regulator overseeing safe and appropriate practice in fertility treatment 
and embryo research.”60 While this interviewee did not regard as desirable wide-ranging 
licensing requirements at this point in time, others were more pessimistic about the ability 
to create an effective oversight system for synthetic biology. According to this latter point 
of view, short of controlling each and every DNA synthesizer, effective oversight is 
impossible. For this governments would need to have good intelligence in place and 
continuously monitor trade patterns. 
 There are two general points worth making in this context: the first is related to the 
many constructive ideas and creative potential within the synthetic biology community that 
became apparent during the conduct of this set of interviews – and an in depth elaboration 
of which is well beyond the scope of this study. Any future attempt to establish a 
governance system for synthetic biology that addresses biosecurity concerns, but that does 
not necessarily stop there, would be remiss if it did not try to utilize this potential. Second, 
on a more cautionary note, many of the responses suggest that in the minds of a significant 
number of interviewees there is no sharp distinction between biosafety and biosecurity 
concerns as the driving force behind a regulatory or governance system for synthetic 
biology. 
 This, however, points back to the starting point of this investigation: the level of 
awareness of biosecurity concerns related to synthetic biology among practitioners in the 
field. Given the significant potential for misuse of synthetic biology outlined at the 
beginning and the strategic instability this may produce and also taking into account the 
history of advances in medicine and biology having been regularly “hijacked” for offensive 
military biological weapons programs, the degree of awareness of biosecurity concerns in 
the synthetic biology community is clearly insufficient. Thus, there need to be greater 
                                                 
60  See http://www.hfea.gov.uk/ 
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efforts to raise this level of awareness. This can be accomplished to some extent as part of 
more general activities to further define the field of synthetic biology and bring its 
members together at events like the international Synthetic Biology conferences, or 
regional events like the European Science Foundation’s upcoming research conference on 
synthetic biology. However, these are singular events that hardly provide the sustained 
effort at awareness raising which would be commensurate with the risks involved in the 
misuse of synthetic biology. The final declaration of SB 2.0 may serve to illustrate the 
point: the one-off character of the attempt to unite the community behind a self-regulation 
approach has led to a declaration the status of which is somewhat unclear – as the version 
publicly available on the internet is still labelled a draft version. Given the misuse potential 
of synthetic biology, a patchwork approach that focuses on self-regulation today and a set 
of different issues tomorrow is clearly insufficient. More systematic and sustained efforts at 
awareness raising and involving synthetic biology practitioners in the biosecurity discourse 
are required. 
 This in turn raises the question “after awareness-raising, what?”61 Clearly, channels 
for a regular dialogue between the biosecurity and synthetic biology communities will have 
to be established, but also for a discourse involving regulatory authorities that are bound to 
become involved in the governance of synthetic biology. What the biosecurity community 
can contribute to this discourse first and foremost is a set of concepts from traditional 
security studies and the analysis of security regimes that will need to be modified in light 
of the paradigm shift synthetic biology is to bring about. An understanding of these 
updated security-related concepts by the synthetic biology community will be essential for 
their successful contribution to preventing the misuse of their field of research. Such a 
contribution will require a more pro-active involvement in the comprehensive 
strengthening of the regime to prevent the misuse of biology for hostile purposes. 
 
 
 
                                                 
61  On this point, see also Malcolm Dando & James Revill, 'Life Scientists and a Culture of 
Responsibility: After Education.What?',  Science and Public Policy, [Forthcoming]. 
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